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SUMMARY
Smoking behavior involves not only a biological addiction,
but also psycho-cognitive components. This runs from
smoking initiation, through to maintaining, attempts at
quitting, and relapse. This perspective is an important
element in studying and intervening in smoking behaviors.
The main aim of this narrative review is to explore tobacco
cigarette smoking behavior, considering the pivotal role of
cognitive mechanisms embedded in decision-making and
in risk judgment, with particular attention to the so-called
Optimistic Bias (OB). The mechanisms through which this
fallacy supports smoking initiation and continuance are
explored, considering the transition from young to adult
smokers and the case of light and intermittent smokers.
Furthermore, additional cognitive mechanisms associated
with the OB, which sustain smoking behavior and prevent
the efficacy of smoking cessation, are described. Finally, a
stimulus for reflection and for discussion about how the
impact of the cognitive bias perspective in tobacco cigarette
smoking is provided, focusing on how it could support
tailored interventions, both in smoking initiation prevention
in adolescents and young adults, as well as in smoking
cessation in high-risk categories. [Beitr. Tabakforsch. Int.
27 (2017) 33–41]
ZUSAMMENFASSUNG
Nicht nur die biologische Abhängigkeit, sondern auch
psychisch-kognitive Komponenten spielen beim Rauch-
verhalten eine Rolle. Das gilt vom Rauchbeginn über das
Weiterrauchen bis zu Rauchstoppversuchen und Rückfäl-
len. Für die Untersuchung und das mögliche Eingreifen in
Rauchverhaltensmuster ist diese Perspektive ein wichtiges
Element.
Das Hauptziel dieser narrativen Übersichtsarbeit besteht
darin, das Rauchverhalten unter Berücksichtigung der
Schlüsselrolle kognitiver Mechanismen in der Entschei-
dungsfindung und Risikoeinschätzung, mit besonderem
Augenmerk auf dem sogenannten optimistischen Fehl-
schluss (Optimistic Bias), zu untersuchen. Es werden die
Mechanismen, durch die dieser Trugschluss den Rauch-
beginn und das Weiterrauchen fördert, dargelegt und der
Übergang vom jungen zum erwachsenen Raucher sowie der
Fall von leichten und gelegentlichen Rauchern betrachtet.
Darüber hinaus werden weitere mit dem optimistischen
Fehlschluss verbundene kognitive Mechanismen, die das
Rauchverhalten aufrechterhalten und die Beibehaltung von
Rauchstopps verhindern, beschrieben. Abschließend werd-
en Anregungen zur Reflexion und Diskussion über die
Auswirkungen der kognitiv verzerrten Wahrnehmung beim
Rauchen von Zigaretten gegeben, in denen es darum geht,
wie sie maßgeschneiderte Interventionen sowohl zur
Prävention des Rauchbeginns bei Jugendlichen und jungen
Erwachsenen als auch beim Rauchstopp von Menschen in
Hochrisikokategorien unterstützen könnten.  [Beitr. Tabak-
forsch. Int. 27 (2017) 33–41]
RESUME
Le comportement tabagique n’implique pas seulement une
assuétude biologique mais est également guidé par des
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composantes psycho-cognitives, dès l’initiation à la
cigarette, durant la consommation régulière, à chaque
tentative de sevrage et à chaque rechute. Cette perspective
constitue un élément important de l’étude et des interven-
tions sur les comportements tabagiques. 
Le principal objectif de la présente revue narrative est
l’exploration du comportement des fumeurs de cigarettes au
tabac, en considérant le rôle central des mécanismes
cognitifs ancrés dans la prise de décision et l’appréciation
du risque et en accordant une attention particulière au
« parti-pris de l’optimisme ». Les mécanismes au travers
desquels ce sophisme sous-tend l’initiation à la cigarette et
la consommation continue sont analysés en s’attardant sur
le passage des fumeurs de l’adolescence à l’âge adulte et le
cas des fumeurs intermittents et légers. Par ailleurs, le texte
décrit d’autres mécanismes cognitifs associés au parti-pris
de l’optimisme, qui alimentent le comportement tabagique
et entravent l’efficacité de la désaccoutumance au tabac. 
Enfin, le texte donne matière à réflexion et à discussion au
sujet de l’impact du parti-pris cognitif sur le tabagisme et
se concentre sur la façon dont cette perspective pourrait
appuyer des interventions personnalisées tant en matière de
prévention de l’initiation à la cigarette chez les adolescents
et les jeunes adultes qu’en matière de sevrage tabagique
pour les catégories à haut risque. [Beitr. Tabakforsch. Int.
27 (2017) 33–41] 
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1. INTRODUCTION
Considering smoking merely as a nicotine addiction, which
justifies the implementation of purely pharmacological
interventions, fails to recognize the human dimension
involved in this behavior and assigns little or no responsi-
bility to the individual through abstinence phases. Accord-
ing to this view, smokers have no explanatory power nor
the possibility to implement behavioral or cognitive
strategies to achieve cigarette abstinence, or to avoid the
risk to relapse in abstinent smokers (1–4).
A pivotal perspective in studying and intervening on
smoking behavior is related to the cognitive distortions in
risk perception and false beliefs that support the smoking
decision over time. In fact, smoking behavior both in the
young and in the adult population is characterized by an
imbalance in risk evaluation called Optimistic Bias (OB).
This bias is associated with other cognitive processes that
altogether favor smoking initiation, sustain its continuance
(5, 6), and impede smoking cessation (7).
2. OBJECTIVES
The main aim of this paper is to explore tobacco cigarette
smoking behavior both in the young and adult population
from a cognitive perspective, considering the pivotal role of
the cognitive bias embedded in decision-making and risk
judgment, the so-called OB, and the other cognitive
mechanisms that are associated to the OB.
More specifically, this review will:
• Describe the nature of the OB, the main cognitive
process that is believed to be involved in smoking
behavior. To this end, a general definition of the OB,
including its application to different fields, will be
provided together with methodological considerations
on its use.
• Provide an overview of the cognitive and psychological
factors that are involved in OB activation in smokers,
taking into account different stages (from smoking
initiation, to maintaining, quitting attempts, and re-
lapse) and different age groups. In these sections,
evidence will be reviewed showing that the OB is
associated with the adoption of smoking behavior in
adolescence. Hence, we will explore how this bias and
other associated cognitive processes may sustain
smoking continuance, in the attempt to overcome
cognitive dissonance.
• Provide a stimulus for reflection and for discussion
about how the impact of the cognitive bias approach in
tobacco cigarette smoking might support tailored
clinical programs, in both prevention to avoid smoking
initiation or the changeover to chronic smoking in
adolescents and emerging adulthood, as well as in
smoking cessation interventions for high-risk catego-
ries.
3. THE OPTIMISTIC BIAS
3.1 A general definition and brief history
The OB reflects the attitude of humans to fail in risk
estimation. It represents the human tendency to underrate
risk and hazard when the risk concerns themselves, chang-
ing this attitude when the risk concerns other people. OB is
not a personality trait, like optimism, but it is an actual
imbalance in risk assessment. Such erroneous estimates,
which are well below the population average, arise from the
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use of heuristics. Heuristics facilitate decision-making and
problem solving (8–11), allowing decisions to be made in
a fast and intuitive way (12), though they are not always
immune from errors. KAHNEMAN stated that when “the
heuristic mind fails, cognitive biases arise” (13). The OB
may represent a serious obstacle from the viewpoint of
behavioral change and preventive behaviors (11, 14). In
fact, people who feel low levels of worry and low disease
susceptibility tend to avoid preventive actions (e.g., eating
healthy food, exercising regularly) (15), and are more
inclined to make unhealthy decisions, such as smoking or
drinking.
3.2 The Optimistic Bias across different domains
The OB has long been a topic of great interest in a wide
range of fields, such as disease occurrence (e.g., heart
diseases and skin cancer), health-related behaviors (e.g.,
nutrition, alcohol consumption, drinking, sexual behaviors,
earthquakes, attempting suicide), crime and violence. The
most extensive research is that focused on the risks related
to health. For example, research conducted on diabetics has
highlighted that these patients believe they are less prone to
experience therapeutic complications than other diabetics
(16). Also, Asians and Caucasians consider to be less
exposed to the likelihood of developing skin cancer (17).
The OB was found to be independent of culture, gender and
age (18). GREEN and colleagues (19) reported that under-
graduate students underestimated their risks of cardiovascu-
lar heart disease (CHD). Data found by GREEN stressed that
only 25% judged their CHD risk as average, while 68%
judged their CHD risk lower than average. GAIL and
coworkers (20) performed a series of experiments on a
sample of 14,000 women showing that they consistently
underestimated their risk of breast cancer. Comparable
results were obtained by FONTAINE and SMITH (21), who
conveyed the presence of the OB for general cancer risk
occurrence.
A significant analysis and discussion on the optimistic
beliefs was presented by JANSEN et al. (22) that reported
the attitude of overestimating the probability of therapeutic
benefits in cancer patients (blood cancer, myelodysplasia,
breast cancer and lung cancer) with advanced disease, who
enrolled in early-phase trials. The optimistic beliefs in
early-phase trials seem to be related to overestimation of
drug efficacy on disease (59.7%), health benefits (62.5%),
and avoiding side-effects of drug treatment (38.9%). 
The OB is also connected with other behaviors, such as
alcohol consumption, diet, and unsafe sexual behaviors. For
instance, college students believe that they themselves have
a reduced probability of experiencing the proximal conse-
quences of alcohol abuse (e.g., hangover) compared to
other students under equivalent conditions (23). People
believe that they follow a healthier diet than others (24) and
estimate that they are less likely to contract sexually-
transmitted diseases (18, 25). For this reason, effective
prevention campaigns are often focused on awareness (19).
Regarding social problems, e.g., crime and violence,
surveys such as that conducted by CHAPIN and colleagues
(26) in a sample of 158 students have shown that individu-
als think they are less likely than their peers to become the
victim of a crime.
3.3 The assessment of the Optimistic Bias: methodological
considerations
In most recent studies, the OB has been measured in two
different ways by direct and indirect methods. The direct
method permits to emphasize comparative distortion in
risk-perception using a single question that requires the
respondents to assess their personal risk of encountering
negative events or hazards compared to the average of other
people. For example, “How likely do you think you are to
get lung cancer compared with the average for other
smokers?” or “How likely is it for you to be involved in a
car accident compared to the average for other drivers?”.
A 7-point Likert scale is used to answer options, ranging
from 1 (much below average) to 7 (much above average)
(27, 28).
Another method to assess the OB is the indirect method. It
requires that respondents provide an answer to two different
questions investigating absolute and comparative risk. The
first one estimates the individual likelihood to encounter
some diseases or conditions (individual risk perception),
using a 7-point Likert scale (ranging from 1 not at all likely
to 7 extremely likely), whereas the second one requires that
respondents estimate the risk that the average peer will
experience concerning some diseases or conditions. If the
mean difference between the second and the first item is
greater than zero, an OB could be identified. Each method
has its advantages and drawbacks, and may be influenced
by the structure of the assessment e.g., the number of risk
options presented (28, 29). Overall, HELWEG-LARSEN and
colleagues (11) suggested that the direct method is more
reliable to detect the OB compared to the indirect method.
Currently, given the variety of events for which the OB can
be identified, validated scales to measure the OB are not
available (28).
4. COGNITIVE DISTORTIONS AND SMOKING
Past research has described smokers as individuals able to
evaluate risks and benefits related to tobacco cigarette
smoking (30). Smoking was thus conceived a direct
consequence of a voluntary, aware and informed decision.
However, SLOVIC’s pioneering research on risk attitude
(31, 14) rejected this assumption observing that smoking
behavior is only “apparently rational” (32). 
Since the 1980s, a growing body of literature has reported
investigations into the OB in tobacco cigarette smokers
(33–35), among which are the pioneering studies of WEIN-
STEIN and his research group (25, 36).
Smokers seem to develop optimistic beliefs about tobacco
cigarette consumption and its consequences, and fail to
recognize hazards related to this dependence, both in the
short and in the long term (37). For instance, BORLAND and
colleagues interviewed a group of smokers, asking them to
assess seven possible causes of death including tobacco
cigarette smoking, and six other behaviors with a lower
probability rate. Only one-third of the heavy smokers chose
cigarette smoking (8).
Smokers are able to find arguments and opinions to justify
the underestimation of their vulnerability, overcoming the
cognitive dissonance produced by risk perception and
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smoking behavior (37). Cognitive dissonance is a conflict-
ing feeling between individual beliefs and behavior (38).
According to this, people act to reduce cognitive disso-
nance. Smokers who are aware of hazards related to
cigarettes try to overcome cognitive dissonance using
rationalized explanations for their unhealthy behavior or for
neglecting health information about risks (39). SIMMONS
and colleagues (2004) reported that smokers may think to
be unable to quit and/or they overvalue positive effects
related to cigarettes (40).
Interestingly, all smokers tend to overrate their risk of
developing smoking-related diseases (lung cancer, heart
disease, and chronic lung pain) compared to nonsmokers,
while they tend to undervalue it compared to other smok-
ers. 
Broadly speaking, smokers know the risks connected to the
use of cigarettes and they are aware of possible future
consequences, but they systematically neglect this informa-
tion in an automatic manner when they are explicitly asked
to evaluate their own risk (5, 35). It is important to note that
people tend to maintain this positive attitude when con-
fronted with conflicting negative information. For instance,
when individuals are confronted with the frequencies of
negative events in the general population, they do not
update their initially optimistic estimations. On the other
hand, when they receive positive information, there is a
substantial update in the new estimation (41). 
5. METHODS
Relevant literature was retrieved from searches of online
bibliographic databases (PubMed, Medline, Embase,
PsycINFO, and the Cochrane Library) along with authorita-
tive texts. However, it should be noted that the present
paper provides a critical perspective on the use of a cogni-
tive approach to tobacco control and it is not intended to be
a systematic review on the application of the OB across
different health domains (42–44). The application of the
cognitive approach to smoking is currently not very
widespread in the scientific literature. For instance by using
“cognitive bias” and “smoking” as starting keywords a total
of 121 publications could be identified on PubMed. Consid-
ering several psycho-cognitive factors connected to the
Optimistic Bias activation, we included in this review’s
literature interrelated concepts such as: availability
heuristic, representativeness heuristic, cognitive disso-
nance, risk perception and decision-making processes.
Sixty-three articles were selected as generally relevant to
the topic. However, in view of the limited use of “OB” as
a keyword even in those papers which use this approach as
the main topic of research, additional searches were
performed through cross-referencing.
6. SMOKING PHASES AND TRANSITIONS
This section explores smoking behavior along a continuum.
In the first sub-section, how the OB is associated with
smoking initiation will be described, particularly focusing
on adolescent smokers. The following sub-section is
dedicated to the population of light and intermittent smok-
ers, which is a common phenomenon in adolescents and
young adults, favoring the transition to a consolidated
smoking addiction. How the OB evolves in order to sustain
the continuation of smoking behavior in adolescent and
adult smokers will then be discussed. Finally, an overview
will be given of the concurrent psychological and cognitive
processes sustaining the activation of the Optimistic Bias
(16, 17, 23, 42), in order to gain a better understanding of
the belief system of smokers.
6.1 Smoking initiation
A growing body of scientific data has affirmed that more
than 80% of all adult smokers begin smoking before the age
of 18 (45, 46). The dual process of physiological and
psychological dependence then reinforces cigarette con-
sumption over time. Early smoking is related to higher
adult smoking rates and lower probabilities of success when
attempting to quit.
ARNETT and colleagues (47) conducted the first study on
ageing and OB in adolescent and adult smokers. They
observed that adolescent smokers showed higher levels of
cognitive distortion in risk perception than adult smokers.
In adolescents, the OB plays a strong role in the acquisition
of smoking behavior. In fact, they tend to assign greater
value to visceral emotions (e.g., the pleasure of smoking)
(46) and to social aspects (social desirability, success, peer
group influence, social identity, etc.) compared to the
benefits of quitting. Concurrently, there is a systematic
underestimation of the risk of becoming dependent on
smoking. Indeed, 60% of adolescent smokers believe that
they could smoke for a few years and then give up. Young
smokers perceive themselves to be at modest risk of
tobacco cigarette dependency because they believe they can
quit smoking before any harm occurs (7, 14). As a conse-
quence, they tend to neglect the risks of developing cancer
in the next 20–30 years.
6.2 Light and intermittent cigarette smokers
The perceived risk of smoking is related to the number of
cigarettes per day. Consistent with this, young smokers tend
to consider that light cigarettes are safer than regular
cigarettes, and that intermittent smoking is less harmful.
Usually, intermittent and light smokers tend to underesti-
mate the harm of cigarette consumption. They also display
a tendency not to perceive themselves as “traditional”
cigarette smokers, but rather as being more similar to
nonsmokers (49, 50). 
Despite these observations, intra-group differences do exist
in risk perception between younger and older adolescents:
older adolescents consider light smoking and intermittent
cigarette smoking as more dangerous than younger adoles-
cents (49).
6.3 Smoking continuance
Adolescent and adult smokers are able to identify the
hazards of smoking in the long term, for instance, the risk
of developing smoking-related diseases such as lung cancer
and cardiovascular problems (30, 31). However, they seem
to have a specific difficulty in attributing themselves such
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risks (51). This aspect is crucial in maintaining smoking
behavior. For instance, smokers in the precontemplation
stage have greater OB than those in contemplation and
preparation stage (52). Consistently with this, the OB
predicts lower cessation rates in populations affected by
smoking-related diseases (53).
GERKING and colleagues (54) noted that health risk con-
cerns are modulated by beliefs about quitting ability: those
who perceive themselves as being able to quit smoking
easily also tend to underestimate health risks. This trend is
strong in young smokers (aged 14–20). Concomitantly,
according to classic decision-making theory, individuals
have difficulties in assessing the future impact and gains of
the present actions in an objective manner. In other words,
they prefer an immediate gain instead of a future gain, also
when this is higher and more significant. This is called
temporal discounting effect (9, 13). Thus, young smokers
assign a greater value to the instantaneous effects (e.g.,
cognitive enhancement) and perceived advantages (as intro-
duced in the paragraph “Smoking initiation”; e.g., achiev-
ing a social identity in peer groups, enhancing hedonistic
pleasure, etc.), despite the long-term effects (e.g., respira-
tory and cardiovascular diseases). Recently, a longitudinal
study on 228 young adolescents (mean age approximately
14 years) reported that subjects who feel invulnerable to
physical harm were more likely to use cigarettes, because
they overestimated the benefits related to smoking (55).
The strength of the OB in young cigarette smokers emerges
in the comparison between former smokers and smokers, as
revealed by a longitudinal study on 7,000 young smokers
(aged between 11 and 18 years) (45, 56). It is interesting to
note that the OB is very important in subjects who have
relapsed after attempts to give up. Indeed, relapsed smokers
decrease their estimated susceptibility to smoking-related
diseases (14). Adult smokers affirm that they have a higher
risk of developing a smoking-related disease, but at the
same time, they are more optimistic about their survival
threshold. 
Interestingly, when older adults are exposed to undesirable
information they show a reduced ability to update their
beliefs as compared to younger adults (and controlling for
confounding variables), while no difference is evident for
desirable information (57).
6.4 Psycho-cognitive modulators in smoking continuance,
cessation, and relapse
The chronic adoption of a hazardous behavior (“I know that
cigarettes are dangerous for my health, but I cannot give
up this pleasure”) can dramatically decrease self-esteem
(“I’m unintelligent, because I'm smoking again despite the
danger to my health”). Frequently, chronic smokers feel a
low self-efficacy about their capacity to quit; thus, in order
to reduce anxiety regarding the health consequences they
activate false beliefs as a coping strategy (“Not all cigarette
smokers die from smoking”). The perceived ability to con-
trol their smoking behavior, in turn, leads smokers to the
false belief that they can quit whenever they want. This
effect is particularly evident in young smokers, as reported
by WATERS and colleagues in a research conducted on 333
young smokers, where a higher risk perception was in-
versely related to the belief that nicotine addiction is
remediable (58).
Figure 1.  Optimistic Bias and related concepts. The figure
represents the relations amongst the psycho-cognitive factors 
described in the text that are involved in the activation and in the
modulation of the Optimistic Bias.
Several expressions commonly used by smokers during
clinical antismoking counselling show this misconception:
“I can go hours without smoking, for example, when I go to
see a movie” or “If I am in an airplane for a travel it is not
difficult for me not to smoke” or “I have reduced my
nicotine addiction using light cigarettes.” In keeping with
this, studies have reported that smokers who are told that
the opportunity to smoke is approaching, experience a rapid
increase in craving (59–61). Conversely, if cigarettes are
perceived as unavailable and the opportunity is far away,
craving is decreased. As a consequence, smokers categorize
smoking behavior as controllable and reversible. The more
an event is considered and classified as “controllable”, the
greater the probability that individuals show OB (62).
Such an attitude is very common in young adult smokers
and intermittent smokers, who believe they possess a high
degree of control over their behavior. This aspect is of
particular importance, since the capacity of nicotine in
producing a physiological addiction is very fast-operating
(63). Systematic underestimation of this phenomenon leads
to being exposed to a high risk of becoming addicted
(32, 64), and thus to increasing cigarette consumption over
time (e.g., from 5 cigarettes per day to more than 20
cigarettes per day). Only after recurrent failed cessation
attempts, cigarette smokers may come to admit that their
choice is only in part voluntary or free. 
Optimistic thinking is reinforced by bias associated with
memory processes. Recurrent behaviors are more easily
accessible, and related risks attenuated, therefore risk
assessment (e.g., the likelihood of developing lung cancer)
is based on specific memories rather than on objective
evaluations (36, 27). This way, smokers activate a
mnemonic mechanism analogous to the availability heuris-
tic. It pushes individuals to draw upon the most “available”
information in their memory, thus reinforcing smoking
behavior (65). This process is activated by the salience of
the information, indeed, salient and vivid events are
recalled more easily. For example, “My grandfather
smoked more than forty cigarettes per day, and he died
when he was 90 years old”. 
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Furthermore, past experience can alter risk perception and
judgment in different ways, influencing related behavior
(25, 40). Having experienced a specific event in the past
leads individuals to consider that this event will most likely
be faced again in the future. For example, people who have
a relative (mother, aunt, grandmother, cousin, or sister)
affected by breast cancer could perceive a higher risk of
this disease, and tend to regularly participate in screening
programs. At the same time, the presence of a cancer case
in the family could influence cigarette consumption in
smokers. On the other hand, not having experienced a
specific event leads individuals to believe that it will not
occur soon. For example, if a smoker has never experienced
cigarette-related respiratory problems, she/he may well
believe that this will not happen in the near future. It is
important to note that habitual smokers do not feel the side
effects of smoking such as shortness of breath, coughing or
mucus because they are gradually adapted to a low health
condition. As a consequence, they have a real difficulty in
evaluating their condition. 
In keeping with these data, BETHEA and colleagues ob-
served that smokers often had an adequate awareness about
the risk of developing lung cancer from cigarette smoking,
while they showed a low awareness for other smoking-
related diseases such as chronic obstructive pulmonary
disease (COPD). This variability may be increased by
having relatives or friends who developed the disease but
never smoked (66).
Finally, two other mnemonic processes are related to the
OB. The first consists of the tendency of smokers to recall
positive smoking-related information more easily such as
hedonistic pleasure, cognitive enhancement, and stress re-
duction compared to negative smoking-related information,
such as coughing and disease (67). This attitude could be
partially explained by another cognitive mechanism, called
positive bias. This bias leads individuals to recall positive
aspects instead of negative information (68). The second
process is connected to the attitude of recalling the salient
stereotype of a specific category of events or people,
evaluating individual risk starting from the most noticeable
or important features. In fact, comparative optimism is
modulated by the representativeness heuristic (62). Here,
individuals tend to evaluate events, objects, or people,
based on the similarity they have with the stereotype of the
category or class (9, 13, 25). For numerous situations or
conditions (e.g., respiratory disease, automobile accidents,
suicides, alcoholism, etc.), individuals tend to create in
their mind a stereotyped idea about the type of person who
experiences such afflictions. When individuals do not
recognize themselves according to the stereotype of the
category, heuristic reasoning drives them to infer that they
will never face this occurrence (65).
For instance, an adult smoker of 30 years of age, who has
smoked ten cigarettes per day for ten years without devel-
oping a clear respiratory symptomatology may have a clear
image of a person affected by emphysema as someone, who
is older (over 60), who smokes more than 25 cigarettes per
day, with serious dyspnea and mobility difficulties due to
coughing and dyspnea. It follows that he will be more
likely to reject the risk of this disease despite clinical
evidence to the contrary, because he does not identify
himself with his image of the category. Similarly, light and
intermittent smokers might continue to smoke, because they
do not recognize themselves in the image of a “typical”
smoker (69). 
7. GENERAL CONSIDERATIONS FOR CLINICAL
INTERVENTIONS IN TOBACCO USE PREVENTION
In the previous section, it was discussed how smoking
decisions may be modulated by the subjective attitude of
underestimating the risks related to cigarettes. From a
behavioral point of view, automatically underestimating the
risk encourages adolescents to try smoking cigarettes.
Later, cognitive illusions lead young adult smokers to
believe that the risk of trying cigarettes is low and this
attitude, in turn, favors the recurrence of cigarette use,
facilitating transition from occasional smoking to chronic
behavior.
According to this framework, antismoking programs should
take into account the following considerations and future
research should assess the efficacy of their implementation
within a multidisciplinary approach.
First, interventions for adolescents should mainly be
directed towards improving awareness of the risk of
becoming a habitual smoker, rather than stressing the long-
term consequences of cigarette smoking. In fact, this
population group tends to overestimate immediate gain
compared to future risks. It is therefore important to include
an assessment of false beliefs, which sustain smoking ini-
tiation and trigger transition from intermittent to habitual
user.
Second, promoting awareness about the benefits gained
from interruption. It is important to stress the benefits
related to a non-smoking lifestyle, instead of only the
hazards connected to cigarette smoking. For instance, older
adults are less likely than younger adults to change their
beliefs when exposed to undesirable information about their
future, while younger adults are more sensitive to immedi-
ate gains. Therefore, focusing intervention programs on the
benefits of smoking interruption is particularly suggested
for both these population groups.
Third, stressing the efficacy related to health protective
behaviors. When individuals place greater trust in the effi-
cacy of their preventive behavior (e.g., smoking cessation,
healthy eating, etc.), they will be more sensitive to the
benefits provided by interruption (e.g., reducing lung
cancer and cardiovascular risk). As a consequence, the
likelihood for success will be higher (70).
Fourth, matching the message with the individual’s charac-
teristics, beliefs and needs. For this reason, an assessment
of the cognitive and psychological aspects of each person
should be included in smoking cessation interventions.
Fifth, modern smoking cessation intervention programs
may benefit from a multidisciplinary approach which takes
into account all the dimensions of smoking. Currently,
investigative research as well as clinical models featuring
these components are lacking and this warrants being
addressed in future studies (71). A theoretical framework of
smoking addiction needs to take into account biological,
social, and psycho-cognitive factors, which interact recipro-
cally in defining a smoker’s profile (4). In developing these
multidisciplinary approaches, the primary aim should be for
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smokers to become aware of the processes implicated in
their tobacco cigarette smoking behavior.
In line with the recent changeover to P4 (predictive, per-
sonalized, preventive, participatory) and P5 medicine,
which stresses the need for a personalized approach to the
patient, calling into play the psycho-cognitive dimension
(72–76), we argue that an in-depth knowledge of the
cognitive and emotional mechanisms involved in risk
perception, decision-making, and cognitive biases is pivotal
to the development of appropriate health intervention
programs aimed at preventing young people from taking up
cigarettes and at favoring interruption in chronic smokers.
Only by recognizing the belief system of the individual and
the emotional mechanisms related to risk judgment, will
render it possible to develop tailored action against the
epidemic phenomenon of tobacco cigarette smoking. In this
vein, a knowledge of cognitive biases represents an
“affordance” to communicate with the individual smoker's
mind. Appropriate research should be designed and con-
ducted in order to investigate the magnitude of possible
benefits connected to the adoption of a broader perspective
and of multidisciplinary approach in tobacco-related health
interventions.
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